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Abstract
First, we replicate the remarkable result of Hossain & Morgan (AER
2009), in which subjects in an experimental market tip almost perfectly to
the superior platform even if an inferior platform enjoys initial monopoly.
Next, we show that this result disappear when seemingly innocent in-
creases in out-of-equilibrium payo¤s are introduced. The inated payo¤s
do not alter payo¤- or risk-dominance relations, and does not impact on
playerssecurity levels. We conclude that the need for a theory of equi-
librium selection cannot be bypassed by appealing to the realities of the
(experimental) market place.
Tanjim Hossain generously shared his program les and instructions with us, making a
close replication possible. The research is nanced by a grant from the Norwegian Research
Council.
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Introduction
In a recent laboratory experiment Hossain & Morgan (2009) - hereafter HM
- nd that the Pareto dominant equilibrium always prevails in a coordination
game. This strong coordination result suggests that markets manage to coor-
dinate on the superior technology platform. However, the coordination result
is fragile. We nd that it breaks down when an innocent change in the out-of-
equilibrium payo¤s of HMs experiment is introduced. If anything, this change
should make coordination on the superior platform more likely according to
standard theory.
One might expect the market to tip to one technology platform when two
ore more platforms compete for market shares in the presence of network e¤ects.
Network e¤ects arise when a user has more utility from a good when other users
have the same good. In situations with a superior and an inferior platform users
face a coordination problem; it is better for all to be on the superior platform
but such coordination requires mutually consistent beliefs and actions. Mutual
consistency can not be taken for granted in the absence of pre play communica-
tion, and perhaps not even in its presence. In such situations central questions
are whether the market equilibrium tips to the inferior or the superior platform
and whether the equilibrium outcome is inuenced by a platform enjoying a
head start.
The QWERTY-phenomena presented by David (1985) is a famous example
of a market tipping to the inferior platform. David argues that we are stuck in
a bad equilibrium with the QWERTY arrangement on keyboards even though
more e¢ cient arrangements like Dvorak exist.
A current example is the choice of car technology; should I go for a fossil fuel
based platform or a new environmental friendly platform, such as an electricity
or hydrogen based one? The network of services (e.g. lling/charging stations,
repair shops and second-hand market) is important for consumers. At the same
time the extent of this network depends on the number of consumers that use the
technology. The possibility of being in a small network may prevent the adoption
of that technology, even if a widespread change of technology is preferred.
Several papers are critical to the QWERTY phenomena. First, Liebowitz &
Margolis (1990 and 1995) question whether the Dvorak keyboard design is really
more e¢ cient. Moreover, they point out that a rm with a new superior platform
has an incentive to sponsor the switch to the new platform. Second, Tellis,
Niraj & Yin (2009) analyze several high-tech markets with potential network
e¤ects, and nd that the highest quality products always end up dominating
the market. Finally, HM conclude from experimental data that the danger of
QWERTY type outcomes in the market lies more in the minds of the theorists
than in the reality of the marketplace.
We test the robustness of HMs remarkable results: (i) markets always coor-
dinate on the superior platform and (ii) a rst mover advantage to the inferior
platform does not inuence the coordination on the superior platform. First we
replicate HMs laboratory results. Then we make our innocent change in the
payo¤s of HMs experiment. The change does not alter the payo¤ matrix in any
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way that, according to standard theory, should wipe out coordination on the
superior platform. However, coordination on the superior platform is wiped out.
No accepted theory of equilibrium selection exist. The most inuential con-
tribution is due to Harsanyi & Selten (1988). Their theory says that if one
particular equilibrium is Pareto dominant as well as risk dominant it ought to
be selected. However, their theory has a rm micro foundation only for 22
games. For n-person games with nite strategy sets, several competing deni-
tions of risk dominance exist (Carlsson & Van Damme 1993).
Equilibrium selection represents the, perhaps, most fundamental unresolved
issue in game theory. Our results cast doubt on HMs notion that experiments
can bypass this issue by appeal to "the reality of the marketplace". Experi-
mentation may, however, indicate what a theory of equilibrium selection must
address. Our results demonstrate that equilibrium selection is not empirically
trivial in the HM format, but is crucially, and somewhat strangely, inuenced
by out-of-equilibrium payo¤s.
Design
Our experiment consists of six sessions. A session consists of three consecutive
sets, and each set consists of 15 periods. In the rst 5 periods of a set subjects
are constrained to choose a monopoly platform ("the incumbent"). In the last
10 periods of a set subjects are free to choose between the incumbent and an
alternative platform ("the entrant"). Thus a session has a total of 45 periods.
Unique subjects were used in di¤erent sessions, and markets of four subjects
were randomly formed at the beginning of each set from a total of either 16 or
20 subjects. The probability of identical markets forming in di¤erent sets of a
session was marginal.
At the start of a session subjects were randomly assigned a type from a
binary type set. Types were kept throughout the session. There were two pairs
of opposite types in each market.
The matrices and the incumbents were varied systematically over the sets in
a session. We utilized four matrixes (Table 1). In the matrices numbers in the
cells of columns 3 and 5 are payo¤s from choosing platform A, while numbers
in the cells of columns 4 and 6 are payo¤s from choosing platform B. Access
fees of the respective platforms are provided for each matrix. Matrices 1* and
2* di¤er from matrices 1 and 2 only by the inated out-of-equilibrium payo¤
in square brackets. The inated payo¤s are inspired by a related work due to
Hossain et al. (2011)
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Table 1: Payo¤ matrices
Matrices 1 [1*] Number of players of the same type
as chooser (including herself)
1 2
Number of players of 0 3, 6 3, 6
opposite type of 1 9,10 6, 7
chooser 2 12, 13 [24] 11, 12
Access fees: (2,5)
Matrices 2 [2*] Number of players of the same type
as chooser (including herself)
1 2
Number of players of 0 4, 4 4, 4
opposite type of 1 8, 11 6, 8
chooser 2 11 [22], 13 10, 12
Access fees: (2,3)
In each of the four matrices there are three equilibria in pure strategies: i)
all four players choose platform A, ii) all four players choose platform B, and
iii) pairs of opposite player-types choose opposite platforms. Matrices 1 and 2
are identical to the ones used in HM. We refer to the equilibria in i) and ii) as
"tipping", while the equilibrium in iii) is referred to as "non-tipping".
In matrices 1 and 1* tipping on platform A (the cheap platform) Pareto
dominates (is superior to) the other pure strategy equilibria. Furthermore, the
superior equilibrium also risk dominates the other pure strategy equilibria.1
In matrices 2 and 2* tipping on platform B (the expensive platform) is supe-
rior to the other pure strategy equilibria. Furthermore, the superior equilibrium
risk dominates the non-tipping equilibrium, while it has the same Nash product
in deviation losses as the equilibrium tipping on platform A (so this relation is
therefore neutral in risk dominance terms).
Inating the out-of-equilibrium payo¤s in matrices 1* and 2* does not impact
on the payo¤- or risk dominance relations between pure strategy equilibria in
the four matrices. The security levels (i.e. maximin) of the players are also
una¤ected by the ination; it is 1 for both platform choices in matrices 1 and
1*, and 2 for platform A in matrices 2 and 2*.
There is also an equilibrium in mixed strategies in each of the four matrices.
In this equilibrium all players randomize with identical distributions over plat-
forms A and B. In going from matrix 1 (2) to matrix 1* (2*), the probability
weight on platform A (B) in the mixed strategy equilibrium is increased. Thus,
our inated out-of-equilibrium payo¤s make coordination on the superior plat-
1As mentioned, several competing denitions of risk dominance exist for n-person games
with nite strategy sets. We use the denition suggested by Güth (1992) throughout. It is a
straight foreward extension of the main ideas in Harsanyi & Selten (1988), and Güth provides
and axiomatic foundation for his extension.
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form more likely, given that the mixed strategy equilibrium is being played.2
The mixed strategy equilibrium is payo¤ dominated by all pure strategy equi-
libria in the original matrices (1 and 2). In the inated matrixes (1* and 2*) the
two tipping equilibria continues to payo¤ dominate the mixed strategy equilib-
rium. However, for one pair of opposite players (but not for the other pair) the
mixed strategy equilibrium payo¤-dominates the non-tipping equilibrium in the
inated matrices.3 This should, if anything, make play of the mixed strategy
equilibrium more attractive in the inated matrices.
To sum up: from standard theory one would expect players facing the inated
matrices to coordinate no less on superior platforms than players facing the
original matrixes.
The six sessions of our experiment are described in Table 2. Sessions I, II
and III replicated HM, while sessions I*, II* and III* extends HM.
Table 2: Sessions (Matrix; Incumbent)
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 N Date
Session I (1; B) (2; A) (1; B) 16 9. November 2011
Session I* (1*; B) (2*; A) (1*; B) 20 9. November 2011
Session II (2; A) (1; B) (2; A) 16 24. January 2012
Session II* (2*; A) (1*; B) (2*; A) 20 25. January 2012
Session III (1; A) (2; A) (1; A) 16 10. November 2011
Session III* (1*; A) (2*; A) (1*; A) 20 10. November 2011
As can be seen, in sessions I and I* the incumbent is always inferior; this
is also the case in sessions II and II* (which simply runs I and I* in reversed
order); while in sessions III and III* the incumbent is always cheap.
To facilitate replication, the original z-tree program les and the original
instructions from HM was used in sessions I, II and III. Files and instructions
were modied only to: i) account for the changed matrices in sessions I*, II*
and III*, and ii) account for the new exchange rate of experimental points (from
points to Norwegian Kroner (NOK) rather than to Hong Kong Dollars).
A total of 108 subjects were recruited by e-mail from the pool of BA students
at BI Norwegian Business School. Subjects were used for a maximum of 90
minutes at expected earnings of approximately 200 NOK. Actual sessions lasted
on average 75 minutes, with average earnings of 196 NOK (which is slightly
above the hourly rate for research assistants at the institution). At the end of
the experiment points earned were converted at a rate of 0.6 NOK per point.
Subjects were paid their earnings privately in NOK on exit.
All sessions were executed in the research lab of BI Norwegian Business
School. On arrival subjects drew a ticket with a number corresponding to their
2The probability of player i chosing (the superior) platform A is 0.374 in matrix 1, and
0.491 in matrix 1*. The probability of player i chosing (the inferior) platform A is 0.561 in
matrix 2, and 0.458 in matrix 2*.
3The expected gain (net of access fees) from playing the mixed stratey equilibrium for
player i is 4.49 (5.45) in matrix 1 (2), and 5.31 (6.15) in matrix 1* (2*).
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cubicle in the lab (in order to break up social groups). Once seated, instructions
were read aloud to achieve public knowledge about the rules of the game, payo¤s,
and exchange rates. Subsequently, the session was conducted with a strict no
communication rule enforced. All interactions were conducted through the PC
network and anonymity was preserved throughout the experiment.
Results
Figure 1 show results from three sets in which the incumbent is expensive and
inferior (set 1 and 3: session I/I*; set 2: session II/II*). The y-axis measures the
average percentage of subjects choosing the superior platform (i.e. the market
share of the superior platform). The solid line use the original matrix from HM,
while the stapled line use the matrix with inated out-of-equilibrium payo¤.
The solid line in Figure 1 corresponds to Figure 1 in HM. The main result
from HM is reproduced. After some initial problems, markets coordinate on the
superior platform. The coordination is not perfect, but after period 8 the market
share of the superior platform stays above 80 percent (excluding the monopoly
phases where the inferior platform was the only choice). However, the result
changes dramatically when the inated payo¤ is introduced. The dotted line
shows that the markets do not coordinate on the superior platform in this case.
In fact, the market share of the superior platform is less than 30 percent for the
last 10 periods. This is certainly surprising since there is no clear mechanism
by which the inated out-of-equilibrium payo¤s should inuence equilibrium
selection.
Figure 2 show results from three sets in which the incumbent is cheap and
inferior (set 1 and 3: session II/II*; set 2: session III/III*). As before the market
share of the superior platform is measured on the y-axis. The solid line use the
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original matrix from HM, while the stapled line use the matrix with inated
out-of-equilibrium payo¤.
The solid line in Figure 2 corresponds to Figure 2 in HM. Again, the main re-
sult from HM is reproduced, while coordination on the superior platform breaks
down when the inated payo¤ is introduced.
Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 show that HMs result on coordination is
fragile. A seemingly innocent change to the out-of-equilibrium payo¤ destroy
market coordination on the superior platform. Thus, the incumbent platform
may retain market shares even if the entrant platform is superior.
Table 3 displays average market share for the superior platform per market
in set 3 ("share"), and the average share of markets that were coordinated on the
superior platform in set 3 ("coord"). The monopoly phase (periods 31-35) was
excluded prior to calculating averages. Data are broken down on sessions and
on original versus inated payo¤s. We use these data to perform Mann-Whitney
U-tests (two sample ranksum tests). Markets are selected as observational units
since strategic interactions takes place within, but presumably (given our match-
ing protocol and information partition) not across markets. Thus market level
data should be independent. The nal set is selected based on the assumption
that behavior has had time to settle down.
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Table 3: Set 3, per market data
Session I Session II Session III
Market share coord share coord share coord
1 0.975 .900 1.000 1.000 .975 .900
2 0.825 .300 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
3 0.975 .900 0.900 0.700 1.000 1.000
4 0.950 .800 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Session I* Session II* Session III*
Market share coord share coord share coord
1 0.400 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.775 0.300
2 0.175 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.525 0.200
3 0.150 0.000 0.700 0.200 0.400 0.000
4 0.400 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.525 0.200
5 0.050 0.000 0.575 0.000 0.325 0.000
First, we test the di¤erences in the market shares of the superior platform
between the original and the inated treatments. The distributions in the two
treatments di¤er signicantly in all sessions (Session I vs I* p = 0.0135; Session
II vs II* p = 0.0123; Session III vs III* p = 0.0123).4 So far we have discussed
market shares of the superior platform as a measure of coordination. Alterna-
tively we may look at the average share of markets that were coordinated. From
Table 3 we see that coordination on the superior platform rarely occurs in the
inated treatments. In fact, there were no instances of such coordination at all
in Session I*.
Second, we test whether costs of the platforms matters for the market share
of the superior platform. In Sessions I and I* the incumbent platform is expen-
sive and inferior, while in Sessions II and II* the incumbent platform is cheap
and inferior. We test the di¤erences of distributions in Session I vs II and in
Session I* vs II*. In both cases there are no signicant di¤erences (Session I
vs II p = 0.1367; Session I* vs II* p = 0.8330). Hence, we nd support for the
same result on costs as HM; costs of the platforms do not seem to matter for
coordination.
Third, we investigate whether the inferiority or superiority of the incum-
bent matters for the market share of the superior platform. In Sessions I and
I* the incumbent platform is expensive and inferior while in Sessions III and
III* the incumbent platform is cheap and superior. We test the di¤erences in
distributions in Session I vs III and in Session I* vs III*. In both cases there
are signicant di¤erences (Session I vs III p = 0.0336; Session I* vs III* p =
0.0439). Since the incumbent platform is di¤erent in Sessions I and III across
both the cost and the Pareto dimension, we cannot directly conclude on what
drives these di¤erences. However, above we established that costs do not seem
4We also nd signicant di¤erences between the original and inated treatments for sets 1
and 2.
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to matter. Further, from Table 3 we see that the market share for the superior
platform is larger in Sessions III and III* than in Sessions I and I*. Thus, our
test indicates that coordination on the superior platform occurs less frequently
when the inferior platform enjoys a rst-mover advantage.
Conclusion
The QWERTY hypothesis is that markets can lock in to a bad equilibrium if an
inferior platform is privileged by an initial monopoly. HMs experiment seem to
disprove this hypothesis. They nd that markets always coordinate on superior
platforms, and that such coordination is not inhibited by the presence of inferior
incumbents.
We demonstrate that their ndings are crucially conditioned on the choice of
payo¤ matrices. Inating out-of-equilibrium payo¤s in ways that, if anything,
ought to facilitate coordination on superior platforms, destroy the results of
HM.
It is worth noting that our ination of payo¤s does not alter the security
levels of players. Thus, our negative result can not be driven by a trade-o¤
between payo¤ dominance and (out-of-equilibrium) security levels, as seems to
be the case in Van Huyk et al. (1991).
Since payo¤- and risk dominance relationships between equilibria in pure
strategies remain unaltered by the ination of payo¤s, the seminal equilibrium
selection theory of Harsanyi & Selten (1988) and Güth (1992) does not come in
to play either.
We are not able to provide a sensible economic interpretation of our inated
matrices compared to the original matrices of HM. In our view neither the
original nor the inated matrices provide some "best representation" of "the
realities of the marketplace". For this reason we believe our negative result
should be taken seriously.
This means acknowledging that we are back at square one: we do not under-
stand equilibrium selection in general, nor - by implication - do we understand
coordination on superior technologies in the presence of network externalities.
Ending on a more positive key; our results indicate that the theory of equi-
librium selection would prosper from paying closer attention to the role of out-
of-equilibrium payo¤s, even when such payo¤s are unrelated to risk dominance
and security levels.
References
Carlsson, H. & E. van Damme (1993): Equilibrium selection in stag hunt
games. In K. Binmore, A. Kirman & P. Tani (eds.) Frontiers of Game Theory.
Cambridge Mass.: The MIT-Press.
David P. A. (1985): Clio and the economics of QWERTY. American Eco-
nomic Review 75 (2), 332-337.
9
Güth, W. (1992): Equilibrium selection by unilateral deviation stability. In
R. Selten (ed.) Rational Interaction: Essays in honour of John C. Harsanyi.
Wien: Springer Verlag.
Harsanyi, J.C. & R. Selten (1988): A General Theory of Equilibrium Selec-
tion in Games. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT-Press.
Hossain, T. & J. Morgan (2009): The Quest for QWERTY. American Eco-
nomic Review 99(2): 435-40.
Hossain, T., Minor, D. & J. Morgan (2011): Competing Matchmakers: An
Experimental Analysis. Management Science 57, 1913-1925.
Liebowitz, S.J. & S.E. Margolis (1990): The Fable of the Keys. Journal of
Law and Economics 33, 1-25.
Liebowitz, S.J. & S.E. Margolis (1995): Path Dependence, Lock-in and His-
tory. The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 11(1), 205-226.
Tellis, G., R. Niraj & E. Yin (2009): Does Quality Win? Network E¤ects
versus Quality in High-Tech Markets. Journal of Marketing Research 46, 135-
149.
Van Huyck, J.B., R.C. Battalio & R.O. Beil (1991): Uncertainty, Equilibrium
Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 106: 885-910.
10
Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREAM) 
Handelshøyskolen BI / Norwegian Business School 
0442  Oslo, Norway 
The objective of CREAM  is to provide research and analysis in the area of industrial
economics and labor economics with applications to management, and provide
research-based analysis for decision makers in public and private sector.
ISSN 1891-599X
